




























                                               5	Similar	cases	discussed	by	Johnston	(2004)	and	White	(2014)	6	On	psychology	of	hallucination,	see	Macpherson	(ed)	
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any	social	situation.	When	there’s	no	reason	to	think	that	these	things	would	make	a	difference	to	the	structural	properties	of	perceptual	experience,	there	is	usually	no	reason	to	control	for	them	either	in	thought	experiments	or	real	experiments.		But	the	things	this	type	of	example	abstracts	from	might	make	a	difference	when	we’re	discussing	the	boundaries	of	epistemic	evaluability.	When	we’re	asking	about	the	rational	standing	of	our	fellow	human	beings,	it	makes	sense	to	consider	cases	that	are	close	to	the	ones	in	which	our	normative	notions	are	ultimately	meant	to	apply.	Social	relationships	and	affect	are	deeply	relevant	to	the	fittingness	of	emotion	and	to	the	justification	of	some	beliefs.	If	we’re	asking	what	would	be	a	reasonable	state	of	mind	for	someone	to	be	in,	our	verdicts	and	predictions	about	that	need	to	stand	up	to	human	situations	in	their	full	complexity.		For	this	reason,	in	considering	whether	the	scope	of	epistemic	evaluability	extends	to	perceptual	experience,	I	found	it	useful	to	consider	the	historically	realistic	example	of	brutal	yet	culturally	normal	situation	that	recurs	in	the	history	of	United	States.	Since	my	book	probes	the	idea	that	perceptual	experiences	could	redound	well	or	poorly	on	a	person,	it’s	important	to	test	this	idea	against	perceptual	situations	that	don’t	abstract	from	the	kinds	of	complexities	missing	from	cases	like	the	red	sphere.		Those	complexities	are	rightly	missing	when	we’re	asking	about	the	metaphysics	of	experience,	but	it’s	less	obvious	that	such	examples	should	be	our	paradigms	when	we’re	asking	about	justificatory	power	and	rational	standing.	The	features	in	perception	we	abstract	away	from	might	be	relevant	a	perceiver’s	rational	standing.		And	I	think	that’s	just	what	we	find.	In	the	type	of	case	I	focus	on	there	are	massive	protests	and	indignation	after	someone	-	almost	always	a	man,	usually	white,	often	armed	and	often	a	police	officer	-	is	acquitted	for	using	force	-	often	lethal	force	-	against	someone	else	who	is	black	(usually	a	man	or	a	boy),	on	the	grounds	that	the	shooter’s	belief	that	that	man	or	boy	posed	imminent	severe	danger	was	reasonable.7	The	protests	come	mostly	from	people	who	live	regularly	with	the	threat	of	this	kind	of	violence	against	them,	their	siblings,	cousins,	etc.	and	who	therefore	navigate	the	consequences	of	being	perceived	as	threatening.		
                                               7	Three	examples:	2014	Ferguson.	In	explaining	to	a	grand	jury	why	it	was	reasonable	for	him	to	shoot	his	gun	at	18	year	old	Michael	Brown,	Darren	Wilson	describes	Brown	as	having	“the	most	intense	aggressive	face.	The	only	way	I	can	describe	it,	it	looks	like	a	demon,	that’s	how	angry	he	looked.”		1973	riots in Queens. Officer Thomas Shea (first NYC police officer tried for murder while on 
duty) acquitted for shooting to death 10 year-old Clifford Glover. Claimed the 4th grader was 
reaching for a gun, but no gun was ever found. 
1964 Harlem riots. Officer Thomas Gilligan shot and killed 15-year-old James Powell in 
Yorkville. They claimed he had a knife, but no knife was ever found.   Other cases never became 






                                               8	On	a	possible	tension	between	coherence	and	evidential	norms,	see	Worsnip	2018.	On	possible	tension	between	evidential	norms	and	norms	governing	what	to	have	beliefs	about,	see	Friedman	2020.	
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